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WRITE THIS DOWN: A MODEL MARKET-
SHARE LIABILITY STATUTE 
LOGAN L. PAGE† 
ABSTRACT 
  The 1980s featured a remarkable series of lawsuits: the DES cases. 
The women who brought these cases had been harmed by a drug—
DES—that their mothers had taken while the future plaintiffs were in 
utero. Hundreds of companies manufactured DES, each unit of DES 
sold was chemically identical, and the harmed women were generally 
unable to identify the manufacturer who had filled their mothers’ 
prescriptions. Many of the plaintiffs could not prove causation as to a 
specific manufacturer and so could not bring traditional tort suits. 
  To provide relief, some courts forged ahead with a new tort theory: 
market-share liability. Under this theory, plaintiffs who were harmed 
by a fungible product and unable to identify the manufacturer who 
produced the unit that harmed them could sue all manufacturers of the 
product and collect from each of them according to their market share. 
But not every court recognized this new theory. And among the courts 
that did, disagreement emerged as to doctrinal determinations and 
mechanical considerations. 
  This Note is the first survey of both the legal and practical questions 
surrounding claims based on market-share liability, from whether a 
prospective plaintiff qualifies for such a cause of action to determining 
the relevant market to pleading requirements. It asserts that market-
share liability furthers the purposes of tort and products-liability law, 
critiques existing state statutory schemes, and proposes a model statute 
for state legislatures to consider. 
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“Lying in her hospital bed after her hysterectomy in 1979, weak 
and wracked with pain, the 24-year-old [Mindy Hymowitz] 
stretched for the telephone and began calling lawyers, one after 
the next. ‘Somebody had to be held responsible,’ she later 
recalled, ‘and it certainly was not my mother.’”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Doctors and patients alike hailed diethylstilbestrol (“DES”) as a 
“miracle drug.”2 Created by a British scientist in 1938,3 the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved it three years later “to treat 
four conditions: menopausal disorders, gonorrheal vaginitis, senile 
vaginitis, and unwanted lactation.”4 DES is a synthetic form of 
estrogen,5 easier to administer and cheaper to produce than natural 
estrogen.6 Further, the drug promised not only to treat the conditions 
for which it was approved but also to make pregnancy safer and more 
comfortable; some doctors prescribed it to prevent morning sickness.7 
In 1947, the FDA approved marketing DES for preventing 
miscarriages.8  
From the manufacturers’ perspective, the zeitgeist of 1940s 
America could not have been more auspicious. World War II ended, 
the economy surged, and the boys came home. Young Americans 
expressed a desire to begin rearing families. “[C]ouples had reason to 
view babies as anchoring their new, or newly reunited, marriages.”9 
The Baby Boom began.  
All the while, faith in the pharmaceutical industry reached lofty 
heights. The year 1942 saw the first successful use of penicillin on a 
 
 1. Anita Bernstein, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co.: Markets of Mothers, in TORTS STORIES 
151, 152 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 
 2. Id. at 151. 
 3. Id. at 152–53. 
 4. Id. at 154. 
 5. Id. at 152. 
 6. See Randy S. Parlee, Comment, Overcoming the Identification Burden in DES Litigation: 
The Market Share Liability Theory, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 609, 611 n.14 (1982) (noting that DES “was 
preferred over natural estrogen because it was less expensive and could be administered orally”). 
 7. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup; Product-Liability Ruling Left Standing 
by Justices, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/31/us/supreme-court-
roundup-product-liability-ruling-left-standing-by-justices.html [http://perma.cc/83LP-H625] 
(“DES . . . eased morning sickness.”). 
 8. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 154. 
 9. Id. 
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civilian patient to treat an infection,10 transforming the prognosis for 
strep throat, pneumonia, meningitis, gonorrhea, and syphilis, among 
other diseases.11 The first commercial flu vaccines were sold in 1945.12 
And as many as six million women took DES with the hope that it 
would give them “a child expected to be even more healthy than nature 
would have provided.”13  
The tragic—and cruelly ironic—result of this use was the birth of 
as many as three million DES Daughters,14 women exposed to DES in 
utero.15 DES caused a raft of maladies in the children: infertility, 
miscarriages, premature births, and other psychological and emotional 
conditions.16 Arthur Herbst, a physician, published the first scientific 
report linking DES use to clear-cell adenocarcinoma in 1971.17 Within 
a year, the FDA contraindicated DES for use during pregnancy.18 
Lawyers began taking calls, but few took the case. Two problems 
loomed particularly large: state statutes of limitations and tort law’s 
causation requirement.19 Courts found many ways around the statutes 
of limitations,20 but they were reluctant to stray from tort law’s 
traditional causation requirement.21 The first successful DES cases in 
 
 10. Howard Markel, The Real Story Behind Penicillin, PBS NEWS HOUR (Sept. 27, 2013, 2:06 
PM EST), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/the-real-story-behind-the-worlds-first-antibiotic 
[https://perma.cc/5JZS-4CL4]. 
 11. Penicillin, BLACK’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (41st ed. 2005). 
 12. Anthony E. Fiore, Carolyn B. Bridges & Nancy J. Cox, Seasonal Influenza Vaccines, in 
VACCINES FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 43, 49 (Richard W. Compans & Walter A. Orenstein eds., 
2009). 
 13. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 151, 154. 
 14. Terry Morehead Dworkin, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law, 57 TUL. L. REV. 
602, 628 (1983). 
 15. See, e.g., Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 279 n.1 (Fla. 1990) (noting that 
“medical researchers established a possible link between exposure to DES while in utero and the 
development in young women of a form of cancer known as clear cell adenocarcinoma”). 
 16. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 156–57. 
 17. Id. at 156. 
 18. See id. at 157 (noting that DES was contraindicated for use during pregnancy in 
November 1971). 
 19. Id. at 162–63. 
 20. See infra notes 100–04 and accompanying text. 
 21. See Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 
68 VA. L. REV. 713, 719 (1982) (“Several decisions have granted dismissals or summary judgments 
for the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff could not identify which manufacturer 
produced the drug that caused her injury.”).  
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New York state required the plaintiffs to prove, with specificity, which 
manufacturer filled her mother’s prescription.22  
The academy suffered no such misgivings. In 1978, Naomi Sheiner, 
a law student at Fordham, published a theory of causation for the DES 
cases.23 While courts generously edited her theory to suit their 
preferences, her comment became the “wellspring” of market-share 
liability.24 The California Supreme Court was the first to adopt market-
share liability, taking pains to explain how the new theory preserved 
tort law’s causation requirement.25 Many others followed, each making 
their own changes.26 New York made the greatest modifications in 
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,27 holding that a DES manufacturer 
“c[ould] be held liable, in proportion to its market share, even if it is 
clear from the evidence that the plaintiff could not have taken its 
drug.”28 Mindy Hymowitz, the nurse and DES Daughter whose quote 
opens this Note, was the named plaintiff.29 DES manufacturers 
appealed from the New York Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court 
 
 22. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 162 (recounting Joyce Bichler’s case and noting that the 
plaintiff was “lucky” because she discovered her injuries before reaching majority and because 
her “mother remembered that [the mother’s] pharmacist had told her the drug came from Lilly”). 
 23. See Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 
FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 974–75 (1978) (presenting and discussing a theory of causation for the 
DES cases). 
 24. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 943 (Cal. 1980) (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
 25. See id. at 937 (majority opinion) (“[E]ach manufacturer’s liability would approximate its 
responsibility for the injuries caused by its own products.”); id. (holding that a defendant can be 
dismissed from the suit if “it demonstrates that it could not have made the product which caused 
plaintiff’s injuries”). Given California’s history of innovation in U.S. products-liability law, it is 
fitting that it was the first state to adopt market-share liability. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 
501 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1972) (expanding strict liability to defects that make a product unsafe 
for its reasonably foreseeable uses); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 
1963) (adopting a strict-liability standard for defects that make a product unsafe for its intended 
use); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) 
(calling for the adoption of strict liability in manufacturing-defect cases).  
 26. These differences will be discussed at length in Part III. 
 27. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989); see Bernstein, supra note 1, 
at 178 (“Hymowitz stands judged for going too far.”); Laura A. Abrams, Comment, The DES 
Dilemma: A Study in How Hard Cases Make Bad Law, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 489, 512 (1990) (“The 
Hymowitz court went far beyond the Sindell court’s holding. It did not even bother trying to fit 
the square pegs into the board with the round holes. The Hymowitz court merely discarded the 
board—which had been the foundation of tort law for centuries—and brought in a different board 
with square holes.”). 
 28. Greenhouse, supra note 7.  
 29. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 166, 173 (noting that Mindy Hymowitz was named in the 
case caption of the “quasi-class action” litigation). 
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of the United States.30 The Court unanimously denied the petition,31 
and market-share liability survived. 
Still today, DES’s physical and metaphysical scars remain. While 
courts divided over whether tort law recognized the DES Daughters’ 
claims,32 they were united in denying relief to plaintiffs with more 
attenuated claims. For example, the New York Court of Appeals 
denied relief to the DES grandchildren.33 A DES Daughter could sue 
for the deformation of her cervix or her vagina, but the child she gave 
birth to, who was injured by these same deformities, could not.34 
Because tort law generally recognizes only economic losses, the stress 
and anxiety of those who knew the DES Daughters—including those 
who gave birth to them—went uncompensated.35  
The DES cases were a tragic mass tort that caught courts and 
legislatures flat footed. But legislatures can ensure that similar fact 
patterns in the future are litigable, which might deter manufacturers 
from bringing harmful products to the market in the first instance. 
States that are serious about providing a remedy to plaintiffs who are 
harmed by generic products, but who cannot identify the particular 
company responsible for the product, should pass statutes codifying a 
right of action. In the DES cases, state courts frequently cited 
deference to the legislature when declining to adopt market-share 
liability, and federal courts sitting in diversity refused to assume that 
the relevant state law recognized market-share liability. To overpower 
this hesitancy, the existing market-share liability case law should be 
 
 30. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) (No. 89-
168). The manufacturers claimed market-share liability violated both the Supremacy Clause and 
the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at i. The filing described the Hymowitz 
court’s application of market-share liability as “[r]adical.” Id. at v. 
 31. Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue, 493 U.S. 944, 944 (1989). Neither Justice Scalia nor Justice 
O’Connor participated in the discussion of whether to hear the case. Greenhouse, supra note 7. 
 32. Compare Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) (recognizing market-
share liability), with Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 247 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) 
(considering, and then rejecting, Sindell). 
 33. Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 199 (N.Y. 1991). 
 34. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 174. 
 35. See David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
747, 762 (1984) (“Tort law historically has refused to compensate emotional injuries alone . . . .”). 
One commentator described the scene in Joyce Bichler’s autobiography where her mother 
testifies on her behalf at trial as “a crucible of mutual pain, where each woman felt she had hurt 
the other.” Bernstein, supra note 1, at 175 (citation omitted). But see Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 
N.W.2d 164, 166–67 (Mich. 1984) (allowing the DES Daughters—and their spouses—to proceed 
under concerted-action and alternative-liability theories of causation).  
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synthesized into a model statute. The balance of this Note does just 
that. 
Although plaintiffs who need market-share liability in order to sue 
are rare, they are easy to imagine. Those injured by any generic drug 
whose side effects have a long latency period would qualify if they 
cannot identify the particular company that supplied their prescription. 
Outside the pharmaceutical context, the rise of 3D printing may 
present identification challenges for plaintiffs injured by products 
printed from identical blueprints but created and sold by multiple 
manufacturers. Commentators call for market-share liability in other 
discrete contexts as well.36  
The Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I argues that market-share 
liability furthers the purposes of tort law and products-liability law, and 
is doctrinally sound. Part II discusses the circumstances in which 
market-share liability applies, how courts determine the appropriate 
market, whether every actor in that market is jointly or severally liable 
for a plaintiff’s injury, and other mechanical considerations. Part III 
argues for the codification of market-share liability and critiques the 
existing state statutes that address market-share liability. Part IV 
unveils the model statute. The Note’s conclusion follows.  
I.  THEORETICAL AND DOCTRINAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MARKET-
SHARE LIABILITY 
Market-share liability is “[l]iability that is imposed, usu[ally] 
severally, on each member of an industry, based on each member’s 
share of the market or respective percentage of the product that is 
placed on the market.”37 This Part demonstrates that market-share 
liability advances the central objectives of tort and products liability. It 
then considers other theories of multiple causation, examines why 
courts determined that those theories did not apply to the DES cases, 
and argues that market-share liability is merely another step down a 
path that tort law has already been walking.  
A. Tort Law  
Tort law serves at least five functions: compensation, deterrence, 
confrontation, responsibility, and punishment. Among these, “[t]he 
 
 36. See infra notes 275–81 and accompanying text. 
 37. Market-Share Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
PAGE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2019  2:45 PM 
2019] MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY STATUTE 1475 
compensation rationale is paramount.”38 Tort law is the most widely 
available recourse for people who have been injured.39 They may not 
have first-party insurance, may not receive charitable donations, and 
may not qualify for government benefits.40 “[T]he comparative 
underdevelopment of social insurance in America”41 may partially 
account for the prevalence of tort law in American society.42 
This compensation rationale overlays and undergirds tort law’s 
deterrence rationale. Tortfeasors that intentionally or negligently 
injure others must internalize the cost of having done so by paying the 
party or parties they have injured.43 Accordingly, people and 
companies must account for the consequences their actions will have 
on third parties.44 And the risk of paying damages deters potentially 
harmful conduct; the more claims that courts recognize, and the more 
likely those claims are to be successful, the more deterred potential 
tortfeasors are likely to be.45  
Further, tort law empowers victims to confront their alleged 
tortfeasors. Neither insurance, nor charity, nor government benefits 
vest victims with this power. The legal system arranges the plaintiff and 
the defendant in an adversarial posture,46 which reduces the chance 
 
 38. DONALD H. BESKIND & DORIANE LAMBELET COLEMAN, TORTS: DOCTRINE AND 
PROCESS 1 (2016). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Gregory C. Keating, Products Liability as Enterprise Liability, 10 J. TORT L. 41, 55 
(2017). 
 42. See id. at 55 (referring to “the comparative underdevelopment of social insurance in 
America” as one of the “peculiarities of the American context”); see also Stathis Banakas, A 
Global Concept of Justice—Dream or Nightmare? Looking at Different Concepts of Justice or 
Righteousness Competing in Today’s World, 67 LA. L. REV. 1021, 1034 (2007) (“As the U.S. 
experience has shown, tort law offers a safety net when social welfare is inadequate.”); id. at 1034 
n.49 (“[T]he weakening of Europe’s welfare state has caused a dramatic increase in tort 
litigation.”). 
 43. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of 
Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 912 (2008) (“The expectation of paying 
compensatory damages forces a potential tortfeasor to internalize the costs of his dangerous 
activity.”). 
 44. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685, 1719 (1976). 
 45. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
1165 (2001) (stating that the deterrent effect of tort law “depend[s] on which victims actually sue 
and the expected outcomes of the resulting litigation”). 
 46. See, e.g., Christopher Kutz, Pragmatism Regained, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1639, 1647 (2002) 
(“All the central issues of tort law . . . involve a confrontation between an injured plaintiff and an 
ostensible injurer.”). 
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that either party seeks redress through extralegal measures.47 In some 
circumstances, courtroom confrontation has therapeutic benefits for 
plaintiffs.48 
These confrontations accentuate tort law’s concern with 
responsibility. Courts hold tortfeasors accountable for their behavior 
by forcing them to pay for its costs.49 Tort law is concerned not only 
with compensating a plaintiff for her injuries but also with ensuring that 
compensation comes from the person who harmed her.50 
Responsibility tethers the plaintiff’s compensation to the defendant’s 
liability.51 
Finally, juries can punish defendants by assessing punitive 
damages, which “serve the same purpose[] as criminal penalties”—
retribution.52 Punitive damages allow juries to ensure that the amount 
the defendant pays, if any, is commensurate with the blameworthiness 
of the defendant’s actions.53 Functionally, punitive damages empower 
juries to compensate plaintiffs beyond what compensatory damages 
allow.54 
B. Products-Liability Law 
Products-liability law is the expression of these tort principles in 
the marketplace for goods. To better effect compensation and 
deterrence, most state courts have adopted a strict-liability standard 
 
 47. See Christopher J. Robinette, Peace: A Public Purpose for Punitive Damages?, 2 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 327, 344 (2008) (“[P]reserving the peace . . . [was] the original purpose of 
what became known as tort law.”). 
 48. See Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights Litigation as a 
Tool for Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2305, 2318–26 (2004) (describing the benefits to victim-
plaintiffs in human-rights litigations and other civil lawsuits). 
 49. Benjamin Ewing, The Structure of Tort Law, Revisited: The Problem of Corporate 
Responsibility, 8 J. TORT L. 1, 1 (2015). 
 50. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 517 (2003) 
(noting that “[t]ort was thus conceived as a law of personal redress” under which a liable 
tortfeasor would “provide redress to the victim, usually in the form of money damages”). 
 51. Id. 
 52. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–17 (2003). 
 53. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1982) (arguing that punitive damages ensure “that the punishment [is] 
proportional to the wrong in an absolute sense, that is, that the punishment fit the crime” (citation 
omitted)). 
 54. See id. at 10–12 (observing that one justification for punitive damages is that “wrongdoers 
deserve punishment, beyond that provided by reparative damages”). 
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for most products-liability suits.55 Plaintiffs in strict-liability cases need 
not prove that the manufacturer intentionally or negligently created 
the defective product that harmed them.56 They must only prove that 
the defendant’s product caused their injury and was defective at the 
time of sale or distribution.57  
Like tort law as a whole, products-liability law’s foremost concern 
is compensating plaintiffs.58 Companies that lose products-liability suits 
compensate successful plaintiffs through insurance pooling59 and risk 
spreading.60 These corporate processes reflect the deterrent effect of 
products-liability law on corporations. They ensure that adequate 
demand exists for potentially harmful products that make it to market 
and deter the creation of harmful products in the first instance.61   
Through insurance pooling, purchasers pay slightly more for a 
product than they would otherwise to ensure that the manufacturer can 
compensate them in case of an accident.62 Generally, few of the people 
who use a product will be injured by it. The injuries that do occur, 
however, are distributed at “random,” and the injured are subject to 
“possibly crushing financial burdens.”63 Strict liability ensures that 
companies that create defective products must pay for the injuries 
these products cause. In response, companies set the prices higher than 
 
 55. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., AARON D. TWERSKI & DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 16 (8th ed. 2016) (describing the adoption of 
the strict-liability standard for products liability into section 402A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts and declaring that it “was destined to dominate . . . the law of products liability to the 
present day”); see also Ellen Taylor, Applicability of Strict Liability Warranty Theories to Service 
Transactions, 47 S.C. L. REV. 231, 238 (1996) (“Almost all states now recognize strict products 
liability under section 402A.”). 
 56. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM. LAW. INST. 
1998) (“One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or 
distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the 
defect.”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See JAMES A. HENDERSON JR., DOUGLAS A. KYSAR & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE 
TORTS PROCESS 539 (9th ed. 2017) (listing “compensating injured plaintiffs” first among seven 
objectives). 
 59. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the 
public as a cost of doing business.”). 
 60. DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 169 (7th ed. 2015). 
 61. See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 62. See OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 60, at 169. 
 63. Id. 
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they would otherwise and designate this “premium” for potential tort 
judgments.64 
In some markets, price competition prevents a company from 
passing onto consumers the entire cost of its tort judgments.65 The 
remaining costs are then distributed through a process known as risk 
spreading.66 When this happens, shareholders, and the company itself, 
absorb some of the risk of consumer injuries.67 These costs may be 
reflected in lower returns to shareholders, suppressed compensation 
for employees, or foregone investments in the firm. Fairness is 
advanced when the firms who create, market, and profit from harmful 
products incur losses to compensate injured plaintiffs.68 
Litigation costs, including judgments to injured plaintiffs, are part 
of a product’s cost of production. Firms will not make products whose 
costs are greater than the revenues the firm can realize through their 
sale. Through this mechanism, products-liability law deters the sale of 
harmful products.69 While the deterrent power of tort law on natural 
persons is often questioned,70 businesses are more sensitive to potential 
litigation costs.71 The effective deterrence of businesses is particularly 
desirable because firms are in a better “position to discover and guard 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. (“[B]ecause competition often prevents manufacturers from raising prices 
significantly, some portion of product accident costs are spread . . . to the owners and operators 
of enterprises that make and sell defective products.”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 168. 
 68. See Keating, supra note 41, at 47 (observing that fairness supports strict enterprise 
liability because it “spreads the costs of product accidents across all those who benefit from the 
product: consumers, producers, and distributors”). 
 69. Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability 
Law: A Response to Professors Polinksy and Shavell, 123 HARV. L REV. 1919, 1948 (2010) 
(concluding that, as a corpus of law, products liability “contributes in direct and indirect ways to 
deterrence”). 
 70. See Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 39, 43 (1994) (“[P]roof that the tort system deters with any degree of precision has not been 
made.”). Commentators disagree not only about whether tort law deters natural persons but also 
about whether it overdeters or underdeters them. Compare, e.g., Jason S. Johnston, Punitive 
Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1411 (1987) 
(noting that an arbitrarily high level of punitive liability results in overdeterrence), with Thomas 
C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks of and Reactions to Underdeterrence in Torts, 70 MO. L. REV. 691, 691 
(2005) (arguing that traditional tort law results in underdeterrence). 
 71. See HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 55, at 446 (stating that a “manufacturer, unlike 
the public, can anticipate or guard against the recurrence of hazards”). 
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against defects in its products and to warn of harmful effects.”72 They 
can also prevent dangerous products from ever reaching the market.73 
This deterrence protects consumer expectations by 
disincentivizing the manufacture and sale of defective products.74 
Historically, products-liability claims against a manufacturer required 
privity of contract,75 thus precluding claims unless the plaintiff had 
purchased the product directly from the manufacturer.76 Because 
modern supply chains made this requirement a legal defense against 
most suits, courts have since abandoned the privity requirement.77 
Nevertheless, consumer expectations still require protection. Through 
advertising, manufacturers create favorable impressions of their 
products’ safety.78 Additionally, consumers operate under a baseline 
assumption that the products they buy are safe.79 
C. Market-Share Liability 
Market-share liability affirms and serves the most fundamental 
purposes of tort and products-liability law—compensation and 
deterrence—although it fails to fully satisfy their other traditional 
justifications. Punishment is not served, for example, because courts 
generally do not allow for the imposition of punitive damages in 
market-share liability suits.80 Neither, at least in the realm of 
medications, is the protection of consumer expectations. Consumers 
seeking medical attention are particularly vulnerable; they may lack 
the expertise, finances, and alternative treatment options to protect 
themselves from potentially harmful side effects.81 Patients may accept 
treatments that bear harmful side effects. Accordingly, products-
 
 72. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980). 
 73. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 74. OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 60, at 167–69. 
 75. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 55, at 6. 
 76. Id. 
 77. It is “now universally recognized” that privity of contract is not required for a products-
liability suit. Id. at 7.  
 78. OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 60, at 167. 
 79. Gerald F. Tietz, Strict Products Liability, Design Defects and Corporate Decision-
Making: Greater Deterrence Through Stricter Process, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1361, 1378 (1993). 
 80. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 54 (Wis. 1984) (noting that a plaintiff 
could not recover punitive damages in a products-liability suit when she could not prove which 
specific defendant created the unit of the product that caused her injuries). 
 81. See McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. Mass. 1985) (“The 
consumer is virtually helpless to protect herself from serious, sometimes permanent injuries 
caused by defective drugs.”). 
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liability law recognizes an exception for “unavoidably unsafe” drugs.82 
Finally, market-share liability deviates from tort law’s binary 
understanding of responsibility. For some courts, allowing a plaintiff to 
collect from a defendant for which the plaintiff was unable to prove 
causation was sufficient reason to reject market-share liability.83 Some 
courts that adopted market-share liability acknowledged this tension.84  
Additional criticisms of market-share liability are more pragmatic 
than doctrinal. Some jurists elected to wait for a legislative response to 
the causation problem.85 Other judges worried that market-share 
liability would stifle innovation in the pharmaceutical industry and that 
courts might inappropriately apply it to nonqualifying products.86 
Finally, the difficulties of determining how many manufacturers 
plaintiffs must sue in their complaint and of defining the relevant 
market “persist[ed] and discourage[d] courts . . . from embracing” 
market-share liability.87 Aware of these problems, several opinions 
adopting market-share liability also suggested that its application 
might be limited to DES cases.88 
These criticisms, however, fail to overshadow market-share 
liability’s reaffirmation of tort law’s fundamental commitments and the 
doctrine’s equitable justifications. “The concept itself meets the 
objectives of tort law, both by providing plaintiffs a remedy, but also 
 
 82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (capitalization 
altered and emphasis omitted from original). DES did not qualify as such a drug. Collins, 342 
N.W.2d at 52. 
 83. See, e.g., Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (“Actionable 
negligence requires a causal connection between the conduct of the defendant and the resulting 
injury to the plaintiff.” (citations omitted)). Zafft characterized market-share liability as an 
“abandonment” of tort law’s “established requirement of proving causation.” Id. at 246–47. 
 84. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (“[W]e choose 
to apportion liability so as to correspond to the over-all culpability of each defendant, measured 
by the amount of risk of injury each defendant created to the public-at-large.”); Collins, 342 
N.W.2d at 49 (noting that the DES manufacturers did not “act[] in concert” but that each 
“contributed to the risk of injury to the public” and that this conduct was a sufficient basis for the 
imposition of tort liability). 
 85. See, e.g., Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986) (“The imposition of 
liability upon a manufacturer for harm that it may not have caused . . . is an act more closely 
identified as a function assigned to the legislature under its power to enact laws.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 247 (describing “legitimate concerns that liability will 
discourage desired pharmaceutical research and development”). 
 87. Id. at 246. 
 88. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1075 (“[T]he DES situation is a singular case . . . .”); see Conley 
v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 285 (Fla. 1990) (“Market share liability is generally looked 
upon as a theory of last resort . . . .”). But see Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 49 (“[T]his method of 
recovery could apply in situations which are factually similar to the DES cases.”). 
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by deterring defendants from negligent acts.”89 Multiple courts 
perceived that mass production and technological advancement would 
lead to an increase in fungible consumer goods.90 Plaintiffs injured by 
these goods would require market-share liability to sue, which made 
the theory necessary to vindicate consumer expectations. Market-share 
liability empowers plaintiffs to bring an entire industry before a court.91  
Equitable considerations, and their existing footholds in tort law, 
also justify market-share liability. Multiple courts considered market-
share liability an extension of the established theory of alternative 
liability.92 The policy judgment at the core of alternative liability, as the 
California Supreme Court described it, is that “as between an innocent 
plaintiff and [culpable] defendants, the latter should bear the cost of 
the injury.”93 On its way to recognizing market-share liability, one court 
noted that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows for a similar 
presumption of fault in circumstances where a plaintiff cannot identify 
her tortfeasor.94  
Rational manufacturers might respond to market-share liability 
by investing in product safety,95 distinguishing their products from 
those of their competition,96 and instituting superior recordkeeping 
 
 89. Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 727 (Haw. 1991). 
 90. See McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1525 (D. Mass. 1985) (observing 
“that the field of products liability has been changed drastically with the advent of mass 
production of fungible goods”); Smith, 823 P.2d at 727 (noting “the creation of fungible goods 
whose source cannot be traced” as one of the policy rationales for market-share liability).  
 91. See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078 (“[W]e adopt a market share theory using a national 
market.”). 
 92. See Smith, 823 P.2d at 727 (noting that one of the policy justifications for market-share 
liability is the principle “that between innocent plaintiffs and negligent defendants, the negligent 
party should be held liable”). Indeed, the Michigan Supreme Court did not bother to reinvent the 
wheel, holding that the DES Daughters could proceed under an alternative-liability theory. Abel 
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 167 (Mich. 1984). 
 93. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980). 
 94. See id. at 283 (noting that market-share liability “would not be the first time this Court 
has relaxed the identity requirement where it would be unjust to adhere rigidly to traditional 
principles of tort law”). The res ipsa loquitur doctrine allows for an inference of negligence where 
circumstantial evidence permits, even absent proof. Mayer v. Once Upon a Rose, Inc., 58 A.3d 
1221, 1226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).  
 95. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936 (concluding that market-share liability will “provide an 
incentive to product safety” to manufacturers). 
 96. See McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. Mass. 1985) (asserting that 
“differen[ces] in size, shape and color” will generally be sufficient to defeat the fungible product 
requirement (citation omitted)). 
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practices.97 The latter two responses would reduce the likelihood of 
market-share liability being applied to future products by making it 
more likely that plaintiffs could identify their tortfeasors. Finally, one 
court supplemented its doctrinal analysis by asserting that “the 
magnitude of the physical and psychological injuries which are at issue 
in DES cases counsels toward permitting a remedy,”98 and a second 
appealed to “equity and fairness.”99 The realization of these lofty ideals 
would require courts to extend existing tort law and midwife market-
share liability into being. 
II.  BUILDING A STATUTE 
A. Necessity and Causation 
Market-share liability, among the courts that adopted it, allowed 
the DES Daughters to recover despite their inability to trace their 
injury to specific defendants. But it did not affect the statute of 
limitations, which requires that a potential plaintiff bring a lawsuit 
within a certain amount of time from the date of the injury.100 Because 
the DES Daughters’ injuries occurred in utero, the statute of 
limitations had often expired before they began attending junior 
high.101 Even in locations that tolled their statutes of limitations until 
minors reached majority, the afflictions associated with DES exposure 
often did not appear until after the statutes expired.102 Plaintiffs cleared 
this hurdle in different ways. In some places, the statute of limitations 
did not begin to run until a plaintiff discovered her injury.103 In New 
 
 97. See Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis. 1984) (declaring that “if relevant 
records do not exist, we believe that the equities of DES cases favor placing the consequences on 
the defendants”). 
 98. McCormack, 617 F. Supp. at 1526. 
 99. Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 727 (Haw. 1991). 
 100. Developments in the Law – Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1950). 
In addition to statutes of limitations, some states also have statutes of repose. Statutes of repose 
are like statutes of limitations, but they begin to run at the time of the “sale by the manufacturer 
or the time when the product was first purchased for use” rather than the time of the plaintiff’s 
injury. See HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 55, at 151. 
 101. See HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 55, at 150 (“The traditional tort statute of 
limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues—at the time of injury to the plaintiff. 
. . . The vast majority of jurisdictions bar actions after two or three years have passed.”). 
 102. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 163 (claiming that, at least “in New York, the statute of 
limitations was a far more pressing problem than identifying the defendant”). 
 103. See HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 55, at 491 (asserting that, in some jurisdictions, 
“the statute of limitations does not generally begin to run until discovery of the injury”). 
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York, public outcry spurred the passage of a revival statute, which 
created exceptions to the ordinary statute of limitations.104  
After avoiding “the Scylla of the statute of limitations,” however, 
plaintiffs still faced “the Charybdis of nonidentification.”105 Causation 
is presumed necessary for tort liability106—an “axiom[] of tort law [is] 
that a defendant may not be held liable unless he caused the injury 
about which the plaintiff is complaining.”107 The DES Daughters did 
not know, and often could not determine, which manufacturer had 
harmed them; they were plaintiffs searching for a theory of 
causation.108  “[T]he near unanimous” opinion of the courts that heard 
DES cases was that no previously accepted theory applied to their 
facts.109  
Plaintiffs generally pleaded market-share liability in the 
alternative and after offering four more-established theories of 
multiple causation: alternative liability, concerted action, industrywide 
liability, and civil conspiracy.110 Courts refused to apply alternative 
liability because that theory’s previous applications required that the 
defendants be better situated than the plaintiff to determine which 
defendant caused the injury, and the plaintiffs could not show that this 
was the case in the DES context.111 Moreover, when market-share 
liability allowed plaintiffs to sue only some manufacturers instead of 
the entire market, there was no guarantee that the responsible 
defendant was among the sued manufacturers.112 And alternative 
 
 104. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 164–65. In addition to ratifying market-share liability, 
Hymowitz rejected four constitutional challenges. The New York Court of Appeals held that the 
revival statute violated neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, nor their parallel clauses in the New York Constitution. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1079–80 (N.Y. 1989). 
 105. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 162. 
 106. Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability Without Cause? Further Ruminations on 
Cause-in-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1379, 1379 (2000). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182, 185 (N.Y. 1982) (recognizing “the practical 
impossibility for most victims of pinpointing the manufacturer directly responsible for their 
particular injury threatens to bar any recovery”). 
 109. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1073. 
 110. While each theory will be distinguished briefly here, exhaustive treatment of the first 
three can be found in the Sindell opinion. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928–36 (Cal. 
1980). Collins addresses civil conspiracy. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 47–48 (Wis. 1984).   
 111. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 929–31 (“While we propose, infra, an adaptation of the rule in 
Summers which will substantially overcome these difficulties, defendants appear to be correct that 
the rule, as previously applied, cannot relive plaintiff of the burden of proving the identity of the 
manufacturer which made the drug causing her injuries.”).  
 112. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 46. 
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liability offered no guidance on how to apportion damages among 
defendants on the basis of their different market shares and, therefore, 
their variable contribution to plaintiff’s injury.113 
Courts distinguished concerted action on its facts. The theory 
requires “substantial assistance or encouragement,” which the 
California Supreme Court noted was lacking in the DES cases.114 
Although DES manufacturers copied and benefitted from each other’s 
safety research and advertising, so do all manufacturers of identical or 
substitutable products.115 Therefore, adopting concerted action would 
greatly expand the doctrine’s reach.116 Moreover, these manufacturers 
were competitors that benefitted from the inability or failure of the 
others to market DES; they were not encouraging each other to cut 
into their profits.117  
Industrywide liability fared no better. The theory requires that 
defendants “jointly control the risk of injury,”118 and its canonical 
illustration is Hall.119 The case involved blasting caps—fungible 
products that harmed users and could not be traced to specific 
manufacturers.120 Evidence that the defendants delegated the 
establishment and enforcement of safety standards to their trade 
association satisfied the joint-control standard because each of them 
cooperated in setting standards through the neutral body.121 In the DES 
cases, by contrast, drug manufacturers abided by regulations set and 
enforced by the government.122  
Finally, plaintiffs pleading civil conspiracy alleged that DES 
manufacturers conspired to deceive the FDA into falsely believing that 
the drug was “safe and efficacious for use in pregnancy.”123 This theory 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 932 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1979)). 
 115. See id. at 933 (“[S]uch conduct describes a common practice in industry . . . .”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at 932 (holding that the plaintiffs’ allegations “do not amount to a charge . . . that 
[defendants] substantially aided and encouraged one another in” their tortious conduct). 
 118. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 47. 
 119. Hall v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 120. See id. at 378 (crediting the plaintiffs’ contention “that they should be relieved of the 
usual burden of proving a causal connection between each of their injuries and a particular 
manufacturer” because “a blasting cap found and exploded by a child often destroys what will be 
the only reliable evidence of its manufacturer”). 
 121. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 934. 
 122. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 47. 
 123. Id.  
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did not apply to manufacturers who only marketed DES for use during 
pregnancy after its 1947 approval for that purpose.124 Plaintiffs pleading 
this theory also failed to establish that the defendants lobbying the 
FDA were conspiring together rather than acting individually.125 And 
so, the DES Daughters found themselves at the mercy of judges, who 
had to decide whether to adopt the novel theory of causation that was 
market-share liability. Many refused to do so,126 and those that did 
rarely agreed on how to paddle plaintiffs past this Charybdis. 
These disagreements touched every stage of litigation. Courts 
disagreed about which products and plaintiffs qualified for market-
share liability, the doctrinal assumptions that market-share liability 
credits, and other considerations necessary to operationalize market-
share liability. These disagreements are considered in turn below, 
alongside proposed resolutions which are reflected in the model 
statute.  
B. The Factual Conditions Necessary for Market-Share Liability 
Commentators have not coalesced around a list of conditions 
necessary for market-share liability to obtain.127 Mindful of this 
disagreement, the model statute proposes that two conditions must be 
met before a plaintiff can plead market-share liability. First, the 
product at issue must be identically produced by multiple 
manufacturers; it must be a fungible product.128 Generic drugs are 
paradigmatic examples. Second, the plaintiff must be unable to identify 
which manufacturer created the specific unit that harmed her.129  
 
 124. See id. at 48 (“[T]his theory becomes unworkable when we consider the fact that many 
drug companies entered the DES market well after FDA approval. These later entrants should 
not be charged with participation in or knowledge of the alleged . . . conspiracies.”). 
 125. See id. (stating that “parallel behavior alone cannot prove agreement”). 
 126. See, e.g., Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 247 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (“There is 
insufficient justification at this time to support abandonment of so fundamental a concept of tort 
law as the requirement that a plaintiff prove, at a minimum, some nexus between wrongdoing and 
injury.”). 
 127. Compare Kathy J. Owen & C. Vernon Hartline, Jr., Industry-Wide Liability: Protecting 
Plaintiffs and Defendants, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 45, 59–60 (1992) (asserting that Sindell lays out 
five conditions), with Kenneth R. Lepage, Note, Lead-Based Paint Litigation and The Problem of 
Causation: Toward a Unified Theory of Market Share Liability, 37 B.C. L. REV. 155, 159 (1995) 
(citing Sindell as support for the proposition that market-share liability cases generally require 
three conditions). 
 128. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) (“[H]ere, all defendants 
produced a drug from an identical formula . . . .”).  
 129. Id. Almost every court enumerated additional requirements, but these can be 
distinguished from statements about the factual context from which the case emerged. For 
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The failure to meet either prong precludes the application of 
market-share liability. In many instances, plaintiffs have struggled to 
show that the product that harmed them was identically produced by 
multiple manufacturers. For an acute example, consider the lead-based 
paint litigations. Lead carbonate is a harmful substance, capable of 
causing nerve damage and lead poisoning.130 However, lead carbonate 
is sold to paint manufacturers before it comes into contact with end 
consumers, with each of the manufacturers adding different amounts 
of lead carbonate to their paints.131 The variable concentrations of lead 
carbonate place lead-based paint beyond the reach of market-share 
liability.132 To recover, plaintiffs must sue the manufacturer of the 
particular lead-based paint that injured them. Despite meeting the 
nonidentification requirement, these prospective plaintiffs fail the 
generic-product requirement.  
The generic-product requirement has also prevented market-
share liability from being used against cigarette manufacturers and 
breast-implant manufacturers. For cigarettes, “plaintiff smokers 
should certainly be able to identify the cigarette brands which they 
have used.”133 Even if each cigarette manufacturer produced cigarettes 
identical to every other manufacturer, packaging and advertising might 
be sufficient grounds to exclude a product from market-share 
 
example, Sindell notes that the plaintiffs must be blameless for their inability to identify the 
specific manufacturers that harmed them. Id. This could be considered a pleading requirement—
plaintiffs must allege that they exercised “due diligence” in attempting to identify the responsible 
manufacturer. See McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. Mass. 1985) 
(considering and rejecting such a requirement). Or it could be considered a statement of factual 
context—plaintiffs who have not even tried to identify the responsible manufacturer may not sue 
under a causation theory of market-share liability; they must sue the identified tortfeasor. It is 
difficult to confidently guess and probably impossible to know until the California Supreme Court 
hears a market-share liability case that is distinguishable from Sindell on that basis.  
Courts may also impose other pleading prerequisites. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937 (requiring 
plaintiffs’ complaint to name manufacturers comprising “a substantial percentage” of the relevant 
market); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (N.Y. 1989) (noting that, absent a 
revival statute, the case would be barred by the statute of limitations, but that the legislature had 
“reviv[ed] these time-barred actions”). These requirements have legal force; they can preclude 
plaintiffs from pursuing an otherwise lawful claim in a qualifying factual setting. However, they 
stem from pragmatic concerns better considered separate from whether or not the plaintiff’s 
factual setting is amenable to a market-share liability theory. Accordingly, they are addressed 
elsewhere. See infra notes 200–13 and accompanying text. 
 130. See Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (App. Div. 1999) (including 
allegations that ingested lead carbonate proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries). 
 131. Id. at 852–53. 
 132. Id. at 854. 
 133. DaSilva v. Am. Tobacco Co., 667 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655 (Sup. Ct. 1997). 
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liability.134 Breast-implant manufacturers also engage in targeted 
marketing; along with the fact that different manufacturers include 
different warnings on the products, this has precluded market-share 
liability for breast implants.135 And in situations where manufacturers 
produce implants with unique designs, the products would necessarily 
fail the generic-product requirement.136   
As far as the author can tell, only one court has deviated from the 
generic-product requirement. In 1991, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
extended market-share liability to blood proteins.137 The plaintiff in 
that case contracted HIV after receiving blood transfusions.138 Despite 
noting that blood proteins are harmful only if the donor who gave them 
is infected, while “DES is inherently harmful,” the court adopted a 
market-share theory of causation.139 Nowhere in its analysis does the 
court justify waiving the generic-product requirement.140 Rather, after 
conceding that the donors of the proteins are not constant—and 
therefore that the proteins themselves are not generic141—it doubles 
down on the nonidentification requirement.142  
Maintaining the generic-product requirement is important for at 
least two reasons. First, allowing potential defendants to excuse 
themselves from market-share liability by creating products that have 
unique physical features increases the chance that injured plaintiffs will 
be able to identify the manufacturers of the products that injure them. 
The requirement incentivizes defendants to brand their products, 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. See In re New York State Silicone Breast Implant Litig., 631 N.Y.S. 2d 491, 494 (Sup. Ct. 
1995) (stating that breast implants “are not generically marketed” and that “the warning inserts 
in each of the products vary”). 
 136. See id. (referencing “differences in the design and composition of the implants” as a 
reason for denying market-share liability). 
 137. Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 727 (Haw. 1991). 
 138. Id. at 721. 
 139. Id. at 724. 
 140. The court does suggest both that the manufacturers’ screening processes used to secure 
blood donations are insufficient to protect the eventual recipients of that blood and that these 
end consumers might not receive sufficient warnings as to the risks associated with the blood 
transfusions. Cf. id. (noting that a “lack of screening of donors and failure to warn are the breaches 
alleged”). To the extent that these practices might have been uniform across the industry, and 
fungible in that sense, the Hawaii Supreme Court may have been seeking to discipline these 
practices. If that was the court’s reasoning, the court nowhere explicitly adopts it. 
 141. See id. (“Factor VIII . . . does not have the constant quality of DES. The reason is 
obvious—the donor source of the plasma is not a constant.”).  
 142. Id. The plaintiff did not contract with a protein manufacturer; instead, he received the 
proteins from his healthcare provider, the United States. Id. at 721. The plaintiff sued all four of 
the manufacturers who provided Factor VIII to the United States. Id. at 722. 
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increases the odds that plaintiffs know who to sue if they are harmed, 
and reduces the cost to all parties of having to litigate market-share 
liability—a theory whose contours, in most jurisdictions, remain 
undefined. Second, the generic-product requirement limits the 
products that are eligible for market-share liability. Manufacturers in 
markets with sufficiently distinct brands (like cigarettes)143 and 
manufacturers of inputs that are used in multiple consumer products 
(like asbestos)144 remain excluded from market share liability. 
The inability to identify one’s tortfeasor does independently 
important doctrinal work; it does not excuse a failure to meet the 
generic-product requirement. The nonidentification requirement 
ensures that when a plaintiff can identify the tortfeasor who harmed 
her, she brings suit against that tortfeasor. It reinforces a reluctance to 
“impos[e] . . . liability upon a manufacturer for harm that it may not 
have caused”145 and ensures that market-share liability remains “a 
theory of last resort.”146 Even though market-share liability is 
consistent with the objectives of tort law and with equitable 
considerations,147 the administrative burden it imposes on the courts 
applying it counsels in favor of limiting its applicability to exceptional 
cases.148 Codification of the generic-product and nonidentification 
requirements achieve this prudential limitation.  
C. Doctrinal Determinations 
Any theory of market-share liability must answer three theoretical 
questions. What is the relevant market?149 Can defendants exculpate 
 
 143. See DaSilva v Am. Tobacco Co., 667 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (noting that “the 
plaintiff smokers should certainly be able to identify the cigarette brands which they have used”). 
 144. See In re New York State Silicone Breast Implant Litig., 631 N.Y.S.2d 491, 494 (Sup. Ct. 
1995) (“[A]sbestos is used in many different products in many different percentages.”). 
Manufacturers use asbestos in home insulation and automobiles, among other products. 
 145. Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986). 
 146. Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 285 (Fla. 1990). 
 147. See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text. 
 148. In rejecting market-share liability, the Illinois Supreme Court wrote that accepting the 
theory would “imprudently bog down the judiciary in an almost futile endeavor.” Smith v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 338 (Ill. 1990). Such pragmatic considerations have shaped the 
doctrinal contours of the theories of market-share liability that courts have adopted. See 
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (“[F]or essentially practical 
reasons, we adopt a market-share theory using a national market.”). Even when doctrinal 
determinations are made independently of such pragmatic considerations, courts recognize the 
objections. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (“We are not unmindful of 
the practical problems involved in defining the market and determining market share . . . .”). 
 149. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 55, at 106. 
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themselves from the proceedings if they can prove their product did 
not injure the plaintiff?150 Is the resulting liability several, or joint and 
several?151 Courts have disagreed on each of these questions. 
1. The Relevant Market.  Courts choose between two different tests 
when defining the relevant market: an as-local-as-possible approach 
and a national-market approach. Adopting the national-market 
approach makes it more likely that a plaintiff can collect at least some 
of her judgment and makes determining a plaintiff’s award easier, 
among other beneficial results.  
The New York Court of Appeals was the first state supreme court 
to hold that a national market was the relevant market for apportioning 
market-share liability.152 After the California Supreme Court in Sindell 
v. Abbott Laboratories153 punted the determination of the relevant 
market in each case to the lower California courts,154 a consensus 
emerged around the as-local-as-possible test.155 One dissenting judge’s 
description of the test could be envisioned as concentric circles, each 
getting smaller.156 As the evidence allows, the market could be defined 
as narrowly as a particular pharmacist’s practice of filling 
prescriptions.157 
The distinction between the two tests lies in how courts define the 
injury that market-share liability is attempting to remedy. The 
national-market approach apportions liability based on “the amount of 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. (“[I]f only a given percentage of defendants who participated in the market at the 
time of injury can be accounted for, who should bear the loss for the missing market shares?”).  
 152. Cf. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078 (distinguishing other states’ approaches to defining a 
relevant market and choosing a national-market approach). 
 153. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
 154. See id. at 937–38 (observing that the determination of the relevant market was a “matter[] 
of proof which properly cannot be determined at the pleadings stage”). 
 155. See, e.g., McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. Mass. 1985) (“[I]n the 
typical situation, the inquiry narrows down to one or two drug stores . . . .” (citation omitted)); 
George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507, 512 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (“[T]he relevant market for 
determining liability [must] be as narrow as possible.” (interpreting Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 
P.2d 368, 377 (Wash. 1984) (en banc))). 
 156. See Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 248 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (Gunn, J., 
dissenting) (arguing in dissent for the adoption of market-share liability and describing the 
contracting nature of the relevant-market inquiry as focused on “the DES mother herself” and 
“the means of proof” available to her, beginning with “the area of her residence” and then 
narrowing to “her drugstore” and, if need be, narrowing as far as to “her pharmacist”). 
 157. Id. 
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risk of injury each defendant created to the public-at-large.”158 The as-
local-as-possible approach is concerned with ensuring that each 
defendant is held liable for the amount of risk to which it exposed the 
individual plaintiff.159 It allows “the imposition of liability only on those 
companies who potentially could have manufactured the drug which 
caused [plaintiff’s] injuries.”160 As to the number of defendants before 
the court, and the grounds for bringing them there, it is “more 
circumscribed and more traditional,” which is why courts are more 
comfortable adopting it.161  
It is also second best. One commentator has written that the as-
local-as-possible test “does violence to the fundamental market share 
liability theory” and fails “to meet even a pretense of even 
handedness.”162 A hypothetical example demonstrates why this is so. 
Imagine two pharmacies and two pharmaceutical companies. Each 
company supplies 90 percent of the DES to one pharmacy and 10 
percent to the other. The daughter of a customer at each pharmacy 
contracts vaginal cancer and sues both companies for the same amount. 
Pharmacy A, which received 90 percent of its DES from Company A, 
kept meticulous records and turns them over to the parties in 
discovery. Pharmacy B has since burned to the ground. All of its 
records were lost in the fire, and Company A is unable to prove that it 
only provided 10 percent of the DES Pharmacy B sold. The general 
practice in market-share liability cases is to presume that each 
defendant before the court contributed equally to the market until 
proof is made to the contrary.163 Although the judgments in these cases 
fully compensate the plaintiff, Company A will have paid 70 percent of 
the damages, despite only being accountable for 50 percent of the 
harm.164  
 
 158. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989). 
 159. Cf. George, 733 P.2d at 512 (“National figures should therefore be admitted when the 
trial court determines that they tend to establish an accurate approximation of the drug 
companies’ local market shares.”). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Aaron D. Twerski, Market Share – A Tale of Two Centuries, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 869, 
871–72 (1989). 
 162. Id. at 871.  
 163. See, e.g., Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 286 (Fla. 1990) (“Each of the 
remaining defendants is presumed initially to have an equal share of the market.”). 
 164. When the court cannot determine how much each company provided to the market 
(here, two pharmacies), the judge assumes they provided an equal amount. Company A is 
assigned 90 percent of the surviving pharmacy’s output and 50 percent of the destroyed 
PAGE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2019  2:45 PM 
2019] MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY STATUTE 1491 
As the Hymowitz decision recognized, allowing DES 
manufacturers to escape judgments for DES injuries solely because 
they did not sell DES to a particular pharmacy was tantamount to 
giving those DES manufacturers a “windfall.”165 The preceding 
example confirms that intuition.  
Harnessing a national market yields further advantages. First, the 
national market is the only market that guarantees that the company 
that made the unit of the product that harmed the plaintiff is held 
responsible for doing so.166 Second, it accounts for the possibility that 
plaintiffs who were harmed out of state might sue in the forum.167 
Third, the more defendants the plaintiff can sue, the less likely it is that 
the plaintiff will be unable to collect much, or all, of her judgment from 
the few insolvent defendants who contributed most to her harm.168 
Such an arrangement also protects vulnerable defendants by aligning 
tort liability with financial resources.169 Small companies that supply all 
of a product to a certain market are more likely to be left bankrupt by 
a tort judgment than a much larger company that has achieved a similar 
monopoly. Where these small companies also produce and sell other 
beneficial products, their bankruptcy harms consumers by removing 
these products from the market.  
Moreover, because national market share does not change across 
fora, the national market is the only market that allows for the 
possibility of uniform judgments across jurisdictions. This requires 
every jurisdiction to recognize market-share liability and to adopt the 
national-market test. The as-local-as-possible approach allows no such 
 
pharmacy’s. After dividing this 140 percent capacity over the 200 percent capacity of both 
pharmacies, Company A is assessed 70 percent of the damages. 
 165. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989). 
 166. See Twerski, supra note 161, at 871–72 (describing the “most uncomfortable” possibility 
that even a plaintiff suing—or for the model statute’s purposes, defendant impleading—“two 
hundred ninety-nine out of a pool of three hundred” defendants might only be suing “non-causal 
defendants”). 
 167. The facts of Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co. hammer home both that every state should codify 
market-share liability and that those statutes should adopt a national market. Mizell v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981). There, the plaintiff had been injured by DES consumption 
in California but had since moved to South Carolina. Id. at 591. The court refused to adopt 
market-share liability because it would be contrary to South Carolina’s “public policy.” Id. at 596. 
The more salient consideration here, however, is the difficulty associated with asking a court to 
perform factfinding involving witnesses and companies situated on the opposite coast every time 
a geographically mobile plaintiff brings suit. 
 168. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 51 (Wis. 1984). 
 169. This assumes that the more financial resources a company has, the more successful it will 
be in bringing its products to the market.  
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symmetry. Two reasonable assumptions support this instinct: First, 
there is at least one pharmacy where none of the DES customers 
experienced ill effects. Second, that pharmacy’s supply of DES is not 
identical to the national supply. Removing this pharmacy guarantees 
that, even if every court applies an as-local-as-possible market, and 
even if those applications are fully informed by the facts necessary to 
trace each DES Daughter’s injury to a particular pharmacy, the 
allocation of liability will not match the respective risks each defendant 
visited upon the public. 
Last, judicial administration is served by adopting the national-
market approach. After Hymowitz, New York litigators built and 
began using a matrix to determine awards.170 The economies of scale 
triggered by one state’s creation of such a matrix are obvious—any 
other state that adopts the national market can use the same matrix to 
resolve claims. The same year, lower California courts built their own 
grid by determining the national market share of DES by manufacturer 
by year.171 Justice by matrix may not give victims the catharsis that 
communities expect from traditional trials and jury awards,172 but it is 
certainly better than arbitrary justice—or no justice at all. Therefore, 
the model statute adopts a national market.  
2. Exculpation.  After deciding which market to adopt, courts must 
then decide whether to allow defendants to exculpate themselves from 
the lawsuit by proving that they did not participate in the market. 
Courts that adopted the national-market approach prohibited such 
exculpation.173 But most courts that adopted the as-local-as-possible 
 
 170. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 170–72. 
 171. Diane S. Wilner & Lee S. Gayer, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly: New York Adopts a “National 
Risk” Doctrine for DES, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 150, 155 (1989). 
 172. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal 
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1402 
(2003) (“[T]rials . . . bring catharsis and closure to victims and the community.”); cf. id. at 1407 
(arguing that, as resolutions to litigation become more efficient, “catharsis, expressive 
condemnation, and the vindication of the community’s norms” all suffer). 
 173. For example, the Court of Appeals of New York explains: 
[T]here should be no exculpation of a defendant who, although a member of the market 
producing DES for pregnancy use, appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff’s 
injury. . . . These fortuities in no way diminish the culpability of a defendant for 
marketing the product, which is the basis of liability here. 
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989). Defendants who were not active 
in the market during the relevant time may exculpate themselves. Id.  
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approach allowed defendants to exculpate themselves from DES 
suits.174 It is worth considering how and why. 
Until Hymowitz, defendants who could prove that they did not sell 
DES in the relevant market were exculpated from the proceedings.175 
Allowing defendants to exculpate themselves better ensures that each 
defendant’s liability corresponds to the specific injuries its products 
caused;176 at the least, all defendants held responsible could have 
actually injured the specific plaintiffs before the court.177 
But this result distorts the rationale and underlying premise of 
market-share liability. Supplying a harmful product to the market is the 
culpable conduct, not the particular sale that harms a particular 
plaintiff.178 All defendants in a market-share liability case 
manufactured fungible products.179 “Each defendant contributed to the 
risk of injury to the public and, consequently, the risk of injury to 
individual plaintiffs . . . .”180 Even courts that allowed defendants to 
exculpate themselves recognized that marketing the drug is the 
blameworthy conduct.181 Allowing a culpable defendant to elude 
liability gives that defendant an undeserved “windfall.”182  
Exculpation also raises prudential concerns. The fact-intensive 
nature of proving that the plaintiff could not have consumed a 
particular defendant’s product means that making the defense 
available disproportionately favors wealthy companies able to “expend 
large sums of money for the detective work necessary to establish the 
defense.”183 Further, if different defendants are able to exculpate 
themselves vis-à-vis different plaintiffs, every case would require “the 
 
 174. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 n.10 (Wis. 1984) (“We . . . require it 
be shown that the defendant drug company reasonably could have contributed in some way to 
the actual injury.”). 
 175. Twerski, supra note 161, at 872. 
 176. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980). 
 177. See, e.g., Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 284 (Fla. 1990) (“The narrower the 
market, the greater the likelihood that liability will be imposed only on those drug companies who 
could have manufactured the DES which caused the plaintiff’s injuries.”). 
 178. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078; see Robinson, supra note 21, at 740 (“‘Fault’ can be 
imputed to a defendant’s conduct from the fact that it made a product that created such a risk. 
Whether the defendant’s actions caused injury in the particular case does not alter the character 
of its conduct.”). 
 179. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 44. 
 180. Id. at 49. 
 181. Conley, 570 So. 2d at 283; Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936. 
 182. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078. 
 183. Twerski, supra note 161, at 872. 
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establishment of a separate market share matrix.”184 This squanders the 
administrative advantages of using a national market.  
It would be disingenuous to paper over the model statute’s 
departure from classic tort law. “Culpability in the air . . . is not the 
business of tort law . . . .”185 Until Hymowitz, “a defendant who could 
prove that its product did not cause the harm in question could 
rightfully walk away from the courthouse without liability.”186 Not 
here. Not where the defendant has manufactured a fungible product 
and the plaintiff is unable to identify the manufacturer of the unit that 
injured her. Under market-share liability, each defendant is “liable, in 
proportion to its market share, even if it is clear from the evidence that 
the plaintiff could not have taken its drug.”187  
This departure is warranted. Indeed, tort law has made 
analytically similar departures before.188 Defendants are culpable for 
marketing a fungible product, each unit of which carries identical risks. 
Even if market-share liability “cannot be reconciled with traditional 
causation theory,”189 the theory sustains tort law’s traditional 
commitments: compensation and deterrence.190 Given these doctrinal 
and prudential concerns, the model statute does not permit defendants 
to exculpate themselves.  
3. Joint Liability.  Courts have also diverged on whether plaintiffs 
or defendants should bear the cost of missing market shares.191 If the 
court adopts joint liability, the defendants will bear the cost of missing 
market shares; if the court does not, the plaintiff will lose that portion 
of her judgment. In some instances, less than 100 percent of the market 
will be accounted for, either because some defendants will have gone 
 
 184. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1077. 
 185. Twerski & Sebok, supra note 106, at 1379. 
 186. Wilner & Gayer, supra note 171, at 155. 
 187. Greenhouse, supra note 7. 
 188. See supra notes 110–25 and accompanying text. 
 189. Twerski, supra note 161, at 873. 
 190. Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 727 (Haw. 1991); see supra notes 38–45, 
55–73, 89–99 and accompanying text. 
 191. Compare Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 383 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (“To the 
extent that other defendants fail to establish their actual market share, their presumed market 
share is adjusted so that 100 percent of the market is accounted for.”), with Brown v. Superior 
Court, 751 P.2d 470, 486 (Cal. 1988) (“It is apparent that the imposition of joint liability on 
defendants in a market share action would be inconsistent with its rationale” of “approximat[ing] 
the injuries caused by the DES it manufactured.”).  
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bankrupt192 or because all defendants will prove their market shares 
and those shares will sum to less than 100 percent.193 Regardless of 
whether the court applies a national market or an as-local-as-possible 
market, the decision about who should bear the cost of missing market 
shares must always be made. In these instances, plaintiffs will be unable 
to collect the unaccounted-for percentages of their judgments; the 
model statute does not recognize joint liability.   
The advantage of joint liability is obvious: it fully compensates the 
plaintiff for her harm.194 It does so, however, by attributing liability to 
tortfeasors who are not responsible for the missing market share.195 
This attribution is unjustified.  
The culpable conduct in a market-share liability case is producing 
the offending product for sale.196 A relationship sufficient to justify 
joint liability would also likely make another theory of multiple 
causation possible.197 Further, joint liability applies only where “each 
tortfeasor is the proximate cause of the entirety of plaintiff’s harm.”198 
That is not true in market-share liability cases. Instead, the percentage 
of the injury for which each defendant is responsible has already been 
calculated; it must have been in order to determine that some 
percentage of the market was missing. That calculation, because it 
represents a defendant’s “fair share of responsibility,” caps a 
defendant’s liability.199 The model statute assigns the costs of missing 
market shares to plaintiffs. 
D. Mechanical Considerations 
The mechanics of how plaintiffs would bring suit under a market-
share liability statute must be considered. Legislators must make 
determinations as to pleadings requirements, the availability of 
 
 192. Twerski, supra note 161, at 873. 
 193. Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 286 (Fla. 1990). At least two different 
explanations could account for this gap. First, a relevant manufacturer might be neither sued by 
the plaintiff nor impleaded by the other manufacturers. Second, because legal proof is imperfect, 
defendants’ proven contributions may sum to fewer units of the product than were in the relevant 
market during the relevant time.  
 194. Martin, 689 P.2d at 381. 
 195. Id. at 382. 
 196. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989). 
 197. See supra notes 110–25 and accompanying text. 
 198. Twerski, supra note 161, at 873. 
 199. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078. 
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punitive damages, and how market-share liability interacts with 
existing state statutes of limitations and repose. 
1. Pleading Requirements. 
i. The Number of Defendants Named in the Complaint.  The model 
statute requires a plaintiff to name only one defendant in her 
complaint.200 For several reasons, this course of action is preferable to 
applying an amorphous “substantial share” standard, under which 
courts attempt to determine, at the pleadings stage, whether the 
complaint names a sufficient percent of the relevant market.201 Given 
differences in market concentration, this standard risks unequal 
enforcement. One defendant is certainly sufficient when that 
defendant accounts for all of the product in a certain market.202 But in 
more competitive markets, even a complaint naming ten defendants 
may not name a “reasonable number.”203 Litigating such a standard 
depletes resources that the bench and the parties could otherwise 
expend on the merits.204 Finally, a defendant has superior information 
as to the identities of other potential defendants;205 manufacturers, 
especially those of fungible products, know their competitors.  
Although the one-defendant standard is imperfect, the 
substantial-share standard offers no advantages. The Sindell court 
conceded that such a standard permitted “a 10 percent likelihood that 
the offending producer would escape liability.”206 This admission 
misunderstands the conduct that market-share liability is intended to 
discipline (the marketing of the product)207 and fails to exploit the 
defendant’s self-interest in impleading other manufacturers and 
gathering evidence of their market shares to reduce its own liability.208 
There is no reason to bar a harmed plaintiff from court because she 
 
 200. See Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 50 (Wis. 1984) (noting the “[p]ractical 
considerations” that weigh in favor of allowing the plaintiff to proceed against a singular 
defendant). 
 201. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980). 
 202. See id. (holding that a complaint must name “a substantial percentage” of the relevant 
market). 
 203. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 50. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.  
 207. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989). 
 208. Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 286 (Fla. 1990). 
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lacks the industry expertise required to learn which companies sold 
which products at a specific time. 
ii. Due-Diligence Requirement.  To prevent frivolous pleadings, 
however, the model statute requires plaintiffs to plead that they have 
exercised due diligence in their attempts to identify the manufacturer 
of the specific unit of the product that harmed them.209 Plaintiffs can 
satisfy this burden by pleading that they have “made a genuine attempt 
to locate and to identify the manufacturer responsible for her injury.”210 
In discovery, defendants will have the opportunity to defeat the 
complaint by showing that no such due diligence took place.211 
It is simply untrue to assert that “[p]laintiffs have little incentive 
to conceal identification information.”212 Consider a plaintiff who has 
learned that a defunct manufacturer caused her injury. Because her 
tortfeasor is judgment-proof, she now has every incentive to try to sue 
the remaining manufacturers under a theory of market-share liability 
and to conceal the identity of the company that made the unit of the 
product that harmed her. But if she concedes her inability to meet the 
nonidentification requirement, she cannot sue under market-share 
liability. It is true that discovery proceedings will allow defendants to 
uproot such claims,213 but they should not be made to bear this 
unnecessary expense. And courts should not be forced to manage 
discovery in cases that claim, but do not qualify for, market-share 
liability. 
2. Punitive Damages.  Plaintiffs suing under the model statute may 
not recover punitive damages. Punitive damages serve a retributive 
function.214 Accordingly, they are considered an individualized 
punishment,215 and they are generally awarded for conduct directed 
 
 209. See id. at 286 (“Where a plaintiff can identify a specific tortfeasor as causing her injury 
and traditional remedies are thus available, we see no reason for resort to a remedy based on the 
concept of risk contribution.”). 
 210. Id. 
 211. McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F.Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. Mass. 1985). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1529. 
 214. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 215. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 875 (1998) (stating that one “objective” of punitive damages is to 
“penalize especially blameworthy individuals” (emphasis omitted)). 
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toward individual plaintiffs.216 Punitive damages further neither of 
these purposes in a market-share liability case.217 By their nature, 
market-share liability cases concern the actions of multiple defendants 
toward an indefinite number of potential consumers.  
3. Statutes of Limitations and Repose.  The model statute 
supersedes any applicable statutes of limitations or repose in the 
jurisdiction. The statute’s identification requirement is likely to limit 
market-share liability’s application to products that result in injury only 
after a long latency period.218 However, “even if one has a just claim[,] 
it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the 
period of limitation.”219 The passage of time increases the chances that 
“evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared.”220 
To balance these considerations, the model statute adopts a three-
year statute of limitations, subject to the discovery rule. The discovery 
rule tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers, or 
reasonably should have discovered, her injury.221 Three years is a 
common length for statutes of limitations.222 
The model statute adopts no statute of repose. Statutes of repose 
bar actions in the same fashion as statutes of limitation.223 They begin 
to run at the time of “sale by the manufacturer or the time when the 
product was first purchased for use.”224 Given the likelihood that the 
harms wrought by products eligible for market-share liability will have 
long latency periods, any such statute jeopardizes a plaintiff’s ability to 
 
 216. See Thomas B. Colby, Clearing The Smoke From Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, 
Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 399 (2008) (arguing against, but 
acknowledging a consensus around, the view that “punitive damages historically were understood 
to serve as punishment for private wrongs to individuals, rather than as punishment for public 
wrongs to society”). 
 217. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 54 (Wis. 1984). 
 218. See Twerski, supra note 161, at 876 (“It is thus highly unlikely that market share will be 
extended . . . to products that do not have latency periods . . . .”). 
 219. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944). 
 220. Id. 
 221. David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Modern Products Liability Law, 70 MO. L. REV. 1, 
36 (2005). 
 222. See HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 55, at 150 (“The vast majority of jurisdictions 
bar actions after two or three years have passed.”). 
 223. See id. at 151 (noting that statutes of repose are triggered by either the manufacturer’s 
sale of the product or the products purchase for use. They generally run for four to twelve years, 
after which “a plaintiff is totally barred from bringing his action”). 
 224. Id.  
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bring an otherwise qualifying market-share liability claim. Even 
outside of the market-share liability context, commentators have 
questioned the fairness of subjecting plaintiffs to statutes of repose.225 
The model statute preserves causes of action that statutes of limitations 
and statutes of repose would displace. 
III.  EXISTING STATE STATUTES 
The relative merits of legislation and common law are familiar to 
any first-year law student. Common law evolves;226 with the ability to 
overturn obsolete precedents,227 courts can keep pace with 
technological and societal advances better than an inflexible statutory 
scheme allows.228 And, so far as societies want to encourage a 
perception of the law as something natural and objective rather than 
manmade and fallible, the common law better comports with this 
perception.229 
Statutes have different strengths. Because the governed 
population elects the legislators who pass the statutes, statutes have a 
democratic legitimacy that unelected state courts lack.230 They also 
bind both state courts231 and federal courts applying that state’s law in 
 
 225. See, e.g., Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d. Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., 
dissenting): 
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can’t die before you are conceived, or be divorced 
before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a house never 
built, or miss a train running on a non-existent railroad. For substantially similar 
reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as a sort of legal ‘axiom,’ that a statute 
of limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action before that cause of action 
exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to the plaintiff. 
 226. See Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Ky. 1984) (“The common law is not a stagnant 
pool, but a moving stream. It seeks to purify itself as it flows through time.” (citation omitted)). 
 227. See DeAngelis v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 445 N.Y.S.2d 188, 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (“We 
are aware that courts should not shirk their duty to overturn unsound precedent and should strive 
to continually develop the common law in accordance with our changing society.”).  
 228. Viva R. Moffat, Regulating Search, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH, 475, 501 (2009). 
 229. See Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of 
Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and The Christian Religion in 
the United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927, 989 (1996) (recounting a historical view 
that the common law was “consistent with divine revelation”). 
 230. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 767 (1997) (mentioning the argument as 
one supporting broader theories of judicial restraint). 
 231. See Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986) (refusing to recognize 
market-share liability and referring to the theory as “social engineering more appropriately within 
the legislative domain”). 
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diversity jurisdiction.232 This binding quality makes statutory 
application more predictable than some common-law doctrines.233 Yet, 
it also entrenches errors, subject to few exceptions.234 Courts could 
interpret a codified theory of tort liability as a deliberate decision to 
abrogate established theories of liability or as a reason for courts not 
to explore novel theories of liability. Given this concern, the model 
statute includes a savings clause.  
The DES litigations attest to the advantages of statutes.235 At least 
two federal courts declined to recognize market-share liability because 
it was not recognized in state law.236 State courts that refused to 
recognize market-share liability as an application of common law 
would be bound by a statute to do so.237  
Three state legislatures have passed statutes addressing market-
share liability. Both Ohio238 and Georgia239 have outlawed it. Georgia’s 
provision is straightforward: “a manufacturer shall not be held liable 
for the manufacture of a product alleged to be defective based on 
theories of market-share or enterprise liability, or other theories of 
industry-wide liability.”240 Ohio’s is similarly clear: “A manufacturer 
 
 232. See McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. Supp. 228, 230 (D.S.D. 1983) (“In the absence 
of a controlling rule established either by statute or by case decision, this court must apply the 
rule it believes the South Dakota Supreme Court would adopt.”). As this quote makes clear, state 
common law also binds federal courts. A state statute, however, can ensure that federal courts 
apply market-share liability in a qualifying context, even if the state’s high court has not yet 
considered the question.  
 233. See Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void for 
Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 314 (2010) (noting, in the 
criminal-law context, that statutes have greater predictive value than common law). 
 234. See David M. Sollors, The War on Error: The Scrivener’s Error Doctrine and Textual 
Criticism: Confronting Errors in Statutes and Literary Texts, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 459, 462 
(2009) (recognizing scrivener’s error and the absurdity doctrine as exceptions to the general rule 
that courts apply statutes as written). A discussion of the ambiguities in Wisconsin’s market-share 
liability statute can be found infra notes 258–63 and accompanying text. 
 235. Although, it would be remiss not to mention that market-share liability is itself a product 
of the common law’s adaptability. 
 236. McElhaney, 575 F. Supp. at 230 (“In the absence of a controlling rule established either 
by statute or by case decision, this court must apply the rule it believes the South Dakota Supreme 
Court would adopt.”); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 596 (D.S.C. 1981) (“Market 
share liability represents a radical departure from the body of products liability law that has been 
developed in South Carolina.”).  
 237. Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 247 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (rejecting market-
share liability and describing its potential adoption as “a public policy choice”). 
 238. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.73(C) (2018). 
 239. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11(d) (2018). 
 240. Id. 
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may not be held liable in a product liability action based on market 
share, enterprise, or industrywide liability.”241  
Conversely, Wisconsin’s statute recognizes market-share liability, 
but only in limited circumstances.242 The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
cited the Wisconsin Constitution for its authority to “fashion an 
adequate remedy” in the DES cases.243 The Wisconsin statute 
attempted to “preserv[e] the narrow and limited application of the risk 
contribution theory of [market-share] liability announced” in that 
case.244 
However, the legislation was intended to overturn a later market-
share liability decision. In Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett,245 the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that manufacturers of white lead 
carbonate could be sued under a market-share liability theory.246 
Wisconsin legislators believed that Mallett’s holding “raised substantial 
questions of deprivation of due process, equal protection, and right to 
jury trial under the federal and Wisconsin constitutions.”247  
To resolve these perceived shortcomings, the statute provides four 
conditions for when market-share liability obtains. First, the product 
must be “chemically and physically identical to the specific product 
that allegedly caused the claimant’s injury or harm.”248 This condition 
effectively distinguishes the white lead carbonate at issue in Thomas 
from DES, which was at issue in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.249 “All DES 
was of identical chemical composition.”250 White lead carbonate, by 
contrast, is an ingredient in lead paint.251 Different lead paints 
contained different concentrations of lead pigments, and different lead 
 
 241. OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.73(C). 
 242. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.046 (2018). 
 243. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 45 (Wis. 1984) (quoting In re D.H., 251 N.W.2d 
196, 201 (Wis. 1977)).  
 244. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.046(1g). 
 245. Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005). 
 246. Id. at 532–33. Although the Wisconsin refers to this theory as a market-contribution 
theory, it is a market-share liability theory for purposes of this analysis because it meets the 
fungible product and nonidentification requirements.   
 247. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.046(1g). The legislative history for each of these three market-
share liability statutes is relatively inaccessible. However, all three of them were passed after the 
Thomas decision. The Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Thomas in 2005. Ohio passed its statute 
in 2007, Georgia followed suit in 2009, and Wisconsin’s is from 2013. It is possible that all three 
are reactions to this ruling. 
 248. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.046(4)(a). 
 249. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Wis. 1984).  
 250. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1989). 
 251. Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (App. Div. 1999). 
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pigments were added to different paints.252 Lead paint, then, was not a 
fungible product, despite the fact that each of its manufacturers used a 
common ingredient. Second, the statute excludes products that have 
any “labeling or any distinctive characteristic[s] that identified the 
manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter.”253 Third, the plaintiff 
must not have any “other lawful process” through which to claim 
relief.254 Fourth, the manufacturer must have “manufactured, 
distributed, sold, or promoted” the product in the plaintiff’s 
“geographic market” at the time her injury occurred.255  
Two additional subsections place specific requirements on 
potential plaintiffs. The plaintiff must name defendants that together 
produced 80 percent of the product in her market at the time of 
purchase.256 And because the statute also includes a twenty-five-year 
statute of repose, a plaintiff must bring suit within twenty-five years of 
the defendant’s last effort to sell or the last sale of the product.257 
Two provisions of the statute are unclear, potentially to the 
plaintiff’s detriment: the definitions of “geographic market” and 
“lawful process.” Courts might construe these ambiguities against a 
plaintiff because the statute cabins market-share liability’s 
applicability.  
Foremost, as to the relevant market, Wisconsin’s statute provides 
limited guidance. A plaintiff’s “geographic market”258 might be the 
plaintiff’s state, county, municipality, or pharmacy. Given that 
Wisconsin’s statute abrogates market-share liability, the legislators 
likely intended to adopt an as-local-as-possible rule, similar to the 
Florida Supreme Court’s.259 If Wisconsin intended this, it is not clear 
from the statute. 
Further, there are many “lawful process[es]” outside of the court 
system from which plaintiffs can seek compensation for, and “redress” 
of, their injuries.260 More than 90 percent of Americans have health 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.046(4)(a). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. § 895.046(4)(b).  
 257. Id. § 895.046(5). 
 258. Id. § 895.046(4)(a). 
 259. The Florida Supreme Court held that “the relevant market . . . should be as narrowly 
defined as the evidence in a given case allows.” Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 284 
(Fla. 1990).  
 260. BESKIND & COLEMAN, supra note 38, at 1. 
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insurance,261 and people injured at work may be eligible for workers’ 
compensation.262 A plain-language reading of the statute bars insured 
plaintiffs and plaintiffs who qualify for workers’ compensation from 
bringing a market-share liability lawsuit. No opinion adopting market-
share liability contemplates such a displacement, and it is unlikely that 
Wisconsin intended one. Rather, the legislature probably intended for 
this language to enforce the identification requirement: if a plaintiff can 
identify the manufacturer of the product that harmed her, she is 
required to sue that manufacturer. Such a plaintiff may not rely on a 
market-share liability lawsuit where a traditional tort action will 
suffice. A simpler means of achieving the same result is to include a 
due-diligence requirement in the pleadings.263 
Wisconsin’s statute of repose would even have precluded some of 
the DES Daughters from bringing suit, threatening to uproot Collins 
along with Thomas. DES’s negative effects had long latency periods; 
Mindy Hymowitz was twenty-four years old when she discovered her 
injuries.264 Because the statute of repose begins running when the 
product is taken off the market, she may have been unable to sue.265 
Since the nonidentification required for market-share liability is likely 
to overlap with a long (possibly, as in the case of DES, 
multigenerational) latency period, a market-share liability statute 
should be exempt from any state statute of repose.266 
 
 261. See Julie Rovner, A Record Percentage of Americans Now Have Health Insurance, TIME 
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://time.com/money/4490196/health-insurance-coverage-census-2015 
[https://perma.cc/8M9Z-6E4B] (reporting an uninsured rate of 9.1 percent). 
 262. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 55, at 68. States vary significantly in how they 
determine whether the employer’s negligence contributed to the worker’s injury, and whether 
and how much a successful worker’s compensation claim might offset a plaintiff’s potential tort 
award. Id. at 80–83.  
 263. See supra notes 209–14 and accompanying text. 
 264. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 163. 
 265. For example, imagine that Hymowitz was twenty-four years and eleven months old when 
she learned of her injuries and that the FDA discontinued DES when Hymowitz’s mother was 
four months pregnant. The statute of repose in Wisconsin’s market-share liability statute would 
prevent Hymowitz from suing. 
 266. See supra notes 223–25 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  MODEL STATUTE 
[STATE] REVISED CODE § 1-001 ET SEQ.: MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
§ 1-001 Statement of Purpose.  
Because market-share liability furthers the compensatory and 
deterrent commitments of tort law, and because courts choosing 
whether to apply market-share liability do not uniformly elect to do so, 
the Legislature has deemed it necessary to codify a theory of market-
share liability. 
§ 1-002 Necessary Factual Conditions for a Plaintiff to Bring a Market-
Share Liability Suit. 
a) The product in question must be fungible. It must be 
manufactured by multiple producers, and every manufactured unit 
must be either physically identical or chemically identical to every 
other manufactured unit.  
b) A plaintiff must be unable to identify the manufacturer of the 
specific unit that harmed the plaintiff. 
§ 1-003 Pleading Requirements.  
a) A complaint need only name one appropriate manufacturer. 
Defendants may implead additional, appropriate manufacturers.  
b) A plaintiff must attest that due diligence was exercised in an 
unsuccessful attempt to identify the manufacturer of the specific unit 
that caused the harm. 
§ 1-004 Trial Administration.  
a) The relevant market shall be the national market for the 
product in question.  
b) Courts may not remove defendants from the proceedings even 
upon a showing that the defendant could not have manufactured the 
unit of the product that harmed the plaintiff. Courts may dismiss 
defendants upon a showing that they were not marketing the product 
in question at the relevant time.  
c) Any liability is several but not joint.  
d) Punitive damages may not be awarded.  
PAGE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2019  2:45 PM 
2019] MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY STATUTE 1505 
§ 1-005 Interactions with Existing Law.  
a) Any otherwise applicable statute of limitations is superseded by 
this subsection. A plaintiff must file suit within three years of the date 
of discovery of injury or within three years of the date upon which the 
plaintiff reasonably should have discovered the injury, whichever is 
earlier.  
b) Any otherwise applicable statute of repose is superseded by this 
subsection. Actions under this section are not subject to statutes of 
repose.  
§ 1-006 Savings Clause.  
This section does not preclude consideration of any novel theory 
of liability proffered by plaintiffs in a tort suit or serve as evidence of a 
legislative intent to abrogate any previously recognized theory of 
liability. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts have proven reluctant to recognize market-share 
liability—for good reason. The conditions necessary to impose market-
share liability are rare.267 And several other theories of multiple 
causation already allow most plaintiffs confronting multiple tortfeasors 
to bring suit.268 The DES cases themselves were a Black Swan event.269 
No single manufacturer held a patent for DES, allowing hundreds of 
producers into the market.270 Today, by contrast, pharmaceutical 
companies “evergreen” their patents, patenting their drugs as many 
times as possible to keep generics, and other manufacturers, from the 
market.271 Moreover, DES was manufactured during the Baby Boom. 
The year 1957 held the record for most births in the United States until 
2007.272 From 1954 until 1964, the United States welcomed more than 
 
 267. See supra notes 127–47 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 110–25 and accompanying text. 
 269. Black Swan events are those which are both “incredibly consequential” and 
“unanticipated.” Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1279 
(2014).  
 270. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 43–44. 
 271. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 503, 526 (2009). 
 272. Erik Eckholm, ’07 U.S. Births Break Baby Boom Record, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/19/health/19birth.html [https://perma.cc/AT5F-QCYF]. 
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four million babies each year.273 For context, 1946’s 3.4 million births 
had been a record.274 And finally, the digitization of records will make 
the nonidentification requirement increasingly difficult to satisfy.  
However, this analysis has not been a purely academic exercise. 
Commentators have called for market-share liability’s application to 
pesticides,275 lead paint,276 genetic modifications,277 and orbital debris.278 
Others, motivated by a desire to discipline actions they perceive as 
harmful, have suggested using market-share liability against drug 
dealers,279 companies that release carbon dioxide,280 and produce 
companies.281 It is possible to envision companies that sell 3D-printing 
blueprints, designed to enable multiple printer owners to create 
physically identical products. If someone is harmed using such a 
product and cannot determine who made it, does market-share liability 
obtain against the printer owners? Against the blueprint company?  
As we learn more about epigenetics282 and how the products we 
use and consume affect our genetic profiles, and our children’s after 
 
 273. Baby Boomers, HISTORY (2010), https://www.history.com/topics/baby-boomers# 
[https://perma.cc/6JBV-93E4]. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Benjamin Thomas Greer, Comment, Market Share Liability Shouldn’t Die: Proposed 
Application to Agricultural Pesticides and the Need the Refine the Apportionment of Liability, 17 
SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 85, 85 (2008). 
 276. Lepage, supra note 127, at 181–82; Lisa A. Perillo, Note, Scraping Beneath the Surface: 
Finally Holding Lead-Based Paint Manufacturers Liable by Applying Public Nuisance and 
Market-Share Liability Theories?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1039, 1040 (2004). Courts have almost 
unanimously rejected lead-paint cases brought under the theory of market-share liability. See, 
e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 994 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1993) (denying the 
application of market-share liability to lead paint). But see Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 
701 N.W.2d 523, 533 (Wis. 2005) (applying market-share liability to lead paint). 
 277. Note, The Price Tag on Designer Babies: Market Share Liability, 59 B.C. L. REV. 319, 
343–44 (2018). 
 278. Mark J. Sundahl, Note, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share 
Liability Regime, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 127 (2000). 
 279. See Joel W. Baar, Note, Let the Drug Dealer Beware: Market-Share Liability in Michigan 
for the Injuries Caused by the Illegal Drug Market, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 139, 145 (1997) (“[M]arket-
share liability . . . should be used to hold illegal drug dealers liable for the injuries that result from 
their involvement in the illegal drug market . . . .”). 
 280. Daniel J. Grimm, Note, Global Warming and Market Share Liability: A Proposed Model 
for Allocating Tort Damages Among CO2 Producers, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 209, 211 (2007). 
 281. See Angela Holt, Note, Alternative Liability Theory: Solving the Mystery of Who Dunnit 
in Foodborne Illness Cases, 2 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. 105, 120–21 (2008) (describing 
market-share liability as a modification of alternative liability and subsequently noting that 
“foodborne illness cases are particularly well-suited” to alternative liability and modifications 
thereof). 
 282. Epigenetics is the study of how the environment can affect the body’s internal chemical 
processes. See Tabitha M. Powledge, Behavioral Epigenetics: How Nurture Shapes Nature, 61 
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that, it is possible to conceive of a suit against manufacturers whose 
generic products are proved to alter a user’s genetic expression. In 
exceptional cases, these consumers’ children might be able to show that 
their parents’ use of the product affected their development or health 
in measurable ways.  
Finally, with more Americans beginning to take prescription 
drugs,283 and those who were already taking prescription drugs 
increasing their usage,284 the risk that a drug harms consumers’ 
offspring, through their epigenetic profiles or otherwise, 
commensurately grows. Whether market-share liability does or should 
apply to these products is for future commentators.  
But if and when those determinations are made, plaintiffs should 
not have to wait for a statute under which to sue, federal courts should 
not have to wait for direction from the states, and state courts should 
not have to look to the academy and each other for guidance. An 
applicable statute should be on the books. The model statute bends tort 
law’s fundamental assumptions. It does so to ensure that tort law does 
not break its fundamental commitment: compensating injured 
plaintiffs. 
 
 
BIOSCIENCE 588, 588 (2011) (defining one branch of epigenetics as the study of how 
environmental factors, including social experience, nutrition, hormones, and toxicological 
exposures, trigger molecular biological changes). In turn, these processes semipermanently alter 
both a person’s genetic profile and the genetic profile they pass on to their offspring. Epigenetics, 
BLACK’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (41st ed. 2005).  
 283. See Brady Dennis, Nearly 60 Percent of Americans – the Highest Ever – Are Taking 
Prescription Drugs, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/to-your-health/wp/2015/11/03/more-americans-than-ever-are-taking-prescription-drugs/ 
?utm_term=.7355a3c79db5 [https://perma.cc/JR6X-JRS5] (“[R]esearchers found that the 
prevalence of prescription drug use among people 20 and older had risen to 59 percent in 2012 
from 51 percent just a dozen years earlier.”). 
 284. See Teresa Carr, Too Many Meds? America’s Love Affair With Prescription Medication, 
CONSUMER REP. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/prescription-drugs/too-many-
meds-americas-love-affair-with-prescription-medication [https://perma.cc/DZ3T-KNB7] (“The 
percentage of Americans taking more than five prescription medications has nearly tripled in the 
past 20 years . . . .”). 
